Case Update (6 May 2024): Korshunova v. Pershyn; practical recognition of a divorce issued by Russian authorities in Crimea
The parties are “married” and seeking to dissolve their marriage in Connecticut. After some initial filings, the Defendant Husband is seeking a divorce, while the Plaintiff Wife is seeking an annulment. The Wife is seeking to dismiss the Husband’s request for a divorce primarily on the basis that his first marriage was dissolved in Crimea, which is a part of Ukraine that the USA recognizes as being occupied by Russia, and that his divorce decree was issued by Russian authorities, which should not be recognized as valid in the USA, and therefore could not have divorced him, making his marriage to Plaintiff Wife bigamous and therefore void ab initio.
The Wife submitted several documents, printed from the internet, and not certified, to support her argument. These documents included, among other things, a “reciprocity schedule” relating to visas that purports that marriages and divorces in occupied Crimea or the non-government controlled Donetsk and Luhansk are not legally recognized in Ukraine and are therefore not valid relationships for U.S. immigration purposes. She also submitted a printout from the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Russia relating to citizenship saying that applications for CRBA and U.S. passports for children born in Crimea must be accompanied by appropriate civil documents, and that the U.S. will not accept or recognize the validity of Russian civil documents issued in Crimea.
The Connecticut Court discussed the concept of practical recognition. “Practical recognition may be accorded such decrees by estoppel, laches, unclean hands, or similar equitable doctrine under which the party attacking the decree may be effectively barred from securing a judgment of invalidity.” In other words, even if the divorce is invalid, courts are reluctant to invalidate such a divorce if it may unset relationships or expectations formed in reliance on the divorce or if the party who is attacking the decree is now taking an inconsistent position, different from her past conduct, and she previously relied on the divorce. If, here, the Plaintiff Wife had accepted benefits based on the original divorce decree, it would be held immune from attack.
In this case, the Wife had originally sought a divorce, before withdrawing her complaint to request an annulment, and clearly thought she was legally married to Defendant. Her behavior throughout their “marriage” so indicated. Therefore, the Wife’s motion to dismiss is denied, in this unpublished opinion.
