Case Update (18 March 2026): In re Uzcategui; mandamus granted to issue writ of habeas corpus to repatriate child pursuant to Venezuelan custody order
The parties are parents to a six year old. The child’s Mother, a Venezuelan obstetrician, appeals an order that denied her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She additionally asks the Court of Appeals of Texas to order a writ of habeas corpus and immediately compel the return of the child to her. The parties were married in Venezuela in 2022. The Father was imminently expected to relocate to the USA for work, so the parties agreed to a custody arrangement, incorporated into a Venezuelan court order in 2023. The Mother was granted “exclusive possession of and decision-making authority for [the child] for a three-year period ending July 6, 2026.” The Father traveled to the USA in May 2023. In December 2023, the Mother left her job, and traveled with the child to the USA, and the parties and child resided together in Austin, Texas until February 2024. At that time, the parties separated. Mother and child moved in with her cousin in Dallas until November 2024. The parties then reconciled, and resumed cohabitating in Austin. In February 2025, the parties had an altercation, which led to the Mother’s arrest. She was transferred to the South Texas ICE processing center, and federal agents denied her request to be reunited with the child prior to her deportation, and her request to have the child be deported with her. Mother claims she communicated with the Father, but he failed to cooperate in returning the child to Venezuela.
The Mother filed her underlying cause of action on October 27, 2025, seeking enforcement of the Venezuelan custody order and a writ of habeas corpus. At a record hearing on January 7, 2026, the petition was denied. She then sought mandamus relief (a denial of habeas corpus to repatriate a child is not appealable).
Finding that the trial court should have compelled the child’s return if it found that the Mother was entitled to possession of the child under the prevailing Venezuelan order, the Court of Appeals reversed, and issued a writ of habeas corpus. Applying Texas’s enactment of the UCCJEA, it found that the factual circumstances under which the Venezuelan order was obtained were in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA, and there was no narrow argument against enforcement (in part because the Father did not argue any). He did argue that the Venezuelan order bears a forged signature for him, and that he had no notice of those Venezuelan proceedings, both arguments dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Finally, the Father had not raised any immediate series concern regarding the child’s welfare. “‘… [u]pon proof of the prior order, absent dire emergency, "the grant of the writ of habeas corpus should be automatic, immediate, and ministerial.’”