Case Update (1 June 2026): Gouda v. Little; Examining whether a foreign court retains jurisdiction to modify its own order
The parties are American citizens, who married in the UAE in 2015. Their son was born in June 2017 in Saudi Arabia. In March 2018, the Mother and child moved to Egypt and began residing with her family. She initiated custody and divorce proceedings in Egypt. The Father continued residing in Saudi Arabia. On June 26, 2018, the Egyptian court granted the Mother sole custody of the child, but with conditions: “The guardian woman must be adult, sane, free, and non-apostate”; “She must be free from the diseases or defects that would make her unfit for custody”; “She must be such an honest guardian that the child doesn’t get lost at her custody”; “She mustn’t be married to person that is a foreigner to the child”; and “She mustn’t stay, with the child, at an apartment owned by a person whom the child hates.” In July 2018, the Mother and child relocated to California. On January 27, 2022, the Mother registered the Egyptian custody order, and filed a UCCJEA declaration. In November 2024, she filed to modify the Egyptian custody order. In April 2025, both parties filed briefs as to whether California had subject matter jurisdiction. The court ultimately concluded it did not, unless Egypt relinquishes jurisdiction. The Mother appealed.
The UCCJEA treats other countries as sister-states unless the other country’s child-custody laws violate fundamental principles of human rights. If the other country issues an order related to the child, then the California court must recognize and enforce the order, so long as it was done under factual circumstances that substantially conform to the UCCJEA. The order from the other country must also not be vacated, stayed or modified by a court with UCCJEA jurisdiction. The court that issues the order then retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the order, short of certain circumstances coming to pass. This means if Egypt retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, the California court could not modify the Egyptian order.
At trial, the Mother argued that the “conditions imposed by the Egyptian court violated fundamental principles of human rights” and therefore, Egypt should not be considered a sister-state, and therefore, California has a clear path to take up jurisdiction to modify the order, or, more likely, render its own new order. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had assessed whether the Egyptian custody order “violated [the Mother’s] state or federal constitutional rights”, confusing that with whether it violated “fundamental principles of human rights” under the UCCJEA. Fundamental principles of human rights is an undefined term in the UCCJEA. The drafters “alluded to a similar provision in the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction” which has been interpreted by the U.S. Department of State as something “utterly shocking the conscience or offending all notions of due process”. The Court of Appeals noted that if, on remand, the trial court concludes there is no violation of these fundamental principles of human rights, and that the order in Egypt was made under facts in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA’s principles, then the trial court must stay proceedings and communicate with the Egyptian court to resolve the jurisdictional conflict. If, on the other hand, the trial court finds there is no enforceable Egyptian custody order, it must separately determine whether California has jurisdiction in this matter. If it has jurisdiction, it may amend the order or craft a new one.
The trial court order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
