Case Update (1 July 2026): Hoie v. Lee; Petitioner entitled to reduced fee and cost award after return of child to Norway

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act - the U.S. implementing statute for the Hague Abduction Convention - provides that “[a]ny court ordering the return of a child… shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner… unless the respondent establishes that such an order would be clearly inappropriate.” In a recent case before the district court in Guam, a Petitioner requested a total of $166,882.72 for attorney fees (in the U.S. and Korea), costs for a private investigator, transportation and lodging for Petitioner and lead counsel to travel to Guam to attend court proceedings, and transportation costs for Petitioner and minor child to return to Norway. The Respondent argues that a fee/cost award should be denied because: (1) Petitioner should have hired only one attorney and that attorney should have been in Guam (to reduce expenses); (2) the off-island lawyer should be compensated at a Guam attorney’s customary hourly rate; (3) the only transport that should be reimbursed is the return of the child to Norway; (4) the Korean attorney and PI fees do not fall under allowable expenses; and (5) the business-class airfares for Petitioner and child should be rejected, in part because they were paid by a corporate account. This is an interesting case in that so many Hague Abduction cases are litigated in federal court by lawyers who are not from the specific jurisdiction in which the case is filed. These cases are highly technical and very specialized. Many local lawyers bring in expert counsel from another jurisdiction to assist and/or litigate the case. Fees in these cases are calculated using the lodestar method (a number of hours reasonably expended on litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate). What is reasonable? - the prevailing rate in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. The community is where the district court sits. If local counsel was unwilling or unable to perform the tasks because they lack experience, expertise, or specialization, then rates from outside of the forum may be used.

The Petitioner here apparently contacted 14 local Guam lawyers, only one of which responded, and who stated that he did not have the expertise. The court noted that this appears to be “the first Hague Convention petition filed in the District Court of Guam”. Therefore, it is not unusual that Petitioner hired a lawyer from outside of Guam, here in Florida. His hourly rate is $500/hour, when a Guam lawyer’s rates are between $300-$350/hour. Petitioner’s lawyer argued that he found rates ordered by courts in Texas to be $500 and in Washington to be $525. He also argued, in the alternative, a rate of $425 based on several cases in NY. The court noted that he didn’t put forth any rates for Florida. His affidavit “did not contain any other information on counsel’s skills or experience or areas of practice.” This lawyer here practices in Jacksonville, Florida. The court finds that in the Middle District of Florida, an hourly rate of $320/hour is reasonable. The court was not inclined to strike either the Florida or local Guam counsel’s fees - it was appropriate to seek a lawyer outside of Guam, and local Guam counsel was necessary to admit him pro hac vice. The court here approved the Florida lawyer’s travel time. Local Guam counsel’s fees were block-billed, which made it difficult to decipher what should be billed, and what should be reduced, so the court reduced these fees by half. The fees claimed for a legal proceeding filed in Korea were not filed under ICARA, and therefore are not recoverable at all. The court reduced, by half, the cost of Florida counsel’s business class airfare to attend hearings in person in Guam, and for Petitioner & the Child’s business class airfare, as well. Further, the court used the federal per diem rate for hotels in Guam, reducing these costs, finding that staying in a luxury hotel was not reasonable. The Petitioner was able to get an award for his PI fees - the PI was found to be vital to locating the child so that a suit could be filed.

In determining whether the fee award is “clearly inappropriate”, the court looked at the prevailing arguments in other district courts - whether the fee award would impose such a financial hardship that it would significantly impair the respondent’s ability to care for the child and/or whether the respondent had a good faith belief her actions were justified. The court disagreed with the Respondent on both accounts.

The total fee and cost award ordered by the court was: $99,609.01.