Case Update (5 Dec 2023): Salkhi v. Behroyan; anti-suit injunction was appropriate to prevent litigant from pursuing foreign divorce

The parties were married in Iran in 2003, and subsequently moved to California. In 2015, Salkhi filed for dissolution in California. They divorced in 2016, by divorce decree that incorporated their Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). Their MSA purported to resolve “all issues concerning marital rights, including child custody and support, spousal support, and division of property.” The MSA included a provision that “released each other ‘from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands and obligations of any kind or nature, whether known or unknown…’”. The MSA included a warranty “that they had disclosed in the MSA all property in their possession and that they did not gift or transfer any community property.” Section 27 of the MSA specifically required the parties to “cooperate with the other in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree consistent with the terms of this agreement.” A separate section stated that the MSA “resolves any and all claims or rights that either party may assert in any Iranian dissolution proceeding to establish an Iranian decree of divorce.” [For a West Virginia case with a similar issue, see Mahdavi v. Mahdavi].

In March 2022, Ex-Wife, Behroyan, filed a request for order enforcing the provision in the MSA that required the parties to cooperate in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree, arguing that the Ex-Husband, Salkhi had “frustrated” her efforts to obtain an Iranian divorce through the “consular divorce process.” She indicated a need to have this process finalized before she could travel to Iran. Salkhi signed the form for a consular divorce, but he refused to attend the Zoom meeting with the cleric. His lawyer indicated that he “did not agree to proceed with divorce using the consular divorce process, as [Salkhi] was ‘not aware that he would be waiving all rights he has under Iranian law by utilizing that process, specifically the right to seek information regarding financial transactions in Iran.’” Salkhi filed a petition for divorce in Iran to permit his attorney to make “investigations” on his behalf. After a hearing, the California court ordered Salkhi to dismiss the lawsuit he filed in Iran with prejudice, and to comply with the consular divorce process. It found that Salkhi’s actions were “his attempt to ‘do-over’ the California dissolution in violation of the judgment incorporating the MSA.”

On appeal, Salkhi argued the California court erred in enforcing the MSA because the consular divorce process “does not result in an ‘Iranian divorce decree,’ and therefore, the Wife’s request that he comply with that process does “not implicate his duty under the MSA to cooperate with her ‘in obtaining an Iranian divorce decree.’” He also argued a violation of due process when the California court compelled him to dismiss his Iranian divorce lawsuit. He argued a distinction and difference between an Iranian religious divorce (through the consular process) and an Iranian divorce decree (from the proceeding he filed). The court disagreed. It believed, based on an expert declaration, that the consular divorce process results in an “Islamic Divorce Certificate” that can be submitted alongside the California divorce decree to the Iranian consulate, which then refers the matter to Iranian courts “for review and registration.” This ultimately results in a decision from the Iranian courts, which falls “squarely within this broad definition of ‘decree’”. Salkhi further argued that even if California courts disagreed with him that the correct proceeding was to file the Iranian lawsuit that he filed, the MSA was ambiguous regarding the process, and therefore the court could not mandate specific performance (i.e., mandate that Salkhi participate in the consular divorce process), but the courts disagreed. Further, Salkhi argued that the mandate to dismiss his Iranian lawsuit is an improper anti-suit injunction. The court recognized that anti-suit injunctions should be ordered sparingly, but found that Salkhi’s filing of the Iranian divorce decree was an “exceptional circumstance justifying an antisuit injunction…” In this case, the California court had already reached judgment, so the usual comity concerns are less strong in that the foreign court “is usually obliged to respect” the judgment. “California courts have long recognized that comity permits the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel to determine what can and cannot be litigated once the first suit is complete.” Ideally, it should be for the foreign court to “determine whether a judgment in a domestic [U.S.] court precludes the foreign litigation…” therefore, federal courts in the U.S. have “required a ‘convincing demonstration’ that the purpose of the foreign action is to evade the judgment.’” Given the timing and circumstances surrounding Salkhi’s pursuit of the Iranian lawsuit, the court concluded he was acting in bad faith. The trial court’s order is affirmed.

*This is an unpublished opinion.